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INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: IS THERE A BETTER
ALTERNATIVE?
INTRODUCTION
nvestor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is the legal mecha-
nism that allows multinational corporations a forum, other
than the court system of the country in which the dispute arose
f7Jost Qo&nt'h5db to a'lit'ate a Qont'o%e'sh letjeen a Qo'*o'a`
tion and the host country.1 Treaties negotiated by the signato-
ries, the government of the host country, and the country in
which the corporation is incorporated, allow corporations to use
tJe W8r8 shstem in Hie& oM tJe Jost Qo&nt'h’s OomestiQ Qo&'t shs`
tem.2 A host country may also give an ISDS tribunal jurisdiction
over a dispute through legislation granting it authority or by
contracting for that forum with the investor.3 The types of dis-
putes brought through the ISDS mechanism are alleged harms
to the foreign corporation caused by the host country.4 These
claims arise from the substantive rules of trade agreements.5 By
implementing ISDS, host countries hope to provide foreign in-
vestors with a neutral forum to address claims of expropriation
by the host country, to prevent discrimination of foreign corpo-
rations by offering them the same rights as local corporations or
third-country corporations, and to provide fair and equitable
treatment to foreign investors.6 Foreign investors have the ex-
clusive right to file claims through ISDS.7 Therefore, if the gov-
ernment would like to bring an action against a foreign corpora-
tion, or if a domestic corporation would like to bring an action
1. Christoph Schreuer, Investment Disputes, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 22 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.
2010).
2. Id.
3. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REP. (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-
sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited Jan. 27,
2018).
4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ASSESSING THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, VOLUME I: MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 109 (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
I
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against the government, it must do so through the domestic
court system.8 Foreign corporations receive this exclusive right
because, unlike the host country, the foreign corporations are
not signatories to the authorizing treaties.9
Before ISDS, if a dispute arose between a foreign individual or
corporation and a host country, the dispute would be heard by
the domestic legal system of the host country.10 For example, if
Corporation A, operating in Venezuela, brought a suit against
the Venezuelan government for lost profits, Corporation A would
need to file and argue the case under the Venezuelan legal sys-
tem.11 For Corporation A to win the case, the Venezuelan judge,
or a jury made up of Venezuelan citizens, would need to find that
its government violated the law and award Corporation A mon-
etary damages to be paid by Venezuelan taxpayers.12 The biases
implicit in the prior system caused multinational corporations to
fear that their grievances were not being heard by a fair and
neutral decision maker.13 Therefore, ISDS was adopted as the
mechanism to remedy these concerns.14 Under ISDS, a foreign
corporation can have its dispute heard by a panel of arbitrators,
who are neither employees nor citizens of the host country the
suit is against.15 The arbitrators are required to be independent
and impartial.16
The appointment of arbitrators depends on the procedural
rules governing the arbitration.17 The International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank (ICSID)
anO tJe 4niteO Ration’s Commission on Wnte'national Trade
Law (UNCITRAL)18 are the most commonly used institutions for
8. Id.
9. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See ISDS—What’s That?, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/isds-whats-
that/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
13. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
14. ISDS—What’s That?, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. 5 (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing
/2014/130710/LDM_BRI(2014)130710_REV2_EN.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the governing of ISDS and creation of model rules.19 Parties,
however, may elect other organizations, such as the London
Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber
of Commerce, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague,
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre,20 or interna-
tional chambers of commerce and regional arbitration centers.21
Typically, arbitrators are selected from a pool of names, which
includes arbitrators from each host country that is a signatory
to the agreement.22 The foreign corporation is responsible for ap-
pointing one arbitrator, the host country appoints another, and
the third is chosen in a way that complies with the agreement
between the parties.23 If there is no language in the treaty ad-
dressing the appointment of a third arbitrator, then the third
arbitrator will be selected by the two other previously appointed
a'lit'ato's o' lh tJe Lo%e'ninL a&tJo'ith’s '&Hes on a**oint`
ment.24 Arbitrators are not bound by case precedent, but at their
own discretion, may refer to prior tribunal decisions when deter-
mining their award.25 Additionally, the arbitrators are not
bound by international law, but may interpret and apply both
national and international law with their awards.26 The choice
of governing law and the scope of the dispute the tribunal may
hear are typically articulated in the agreement between the sig-
natories.27 8ome aL'eements &se l'oaO HanL&aLeb s&QJ as 7aHH
Ois*&tes QonQe'ninL in%estmentsb5 jJile some use very narrow
language, listing only specific types of claims that fall under the
jurisdiction of ISDS arbitration.28 Since the parties have con-
sented to arbitration through treaty or by bringing the claim to
19. Id.
20. ISDS—What’s That?, supra note 12.
21. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 16, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Schreuer, supra note 1, ¶ 22.
24. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 16, at 3.
25. Id.
26. Schreuer, supra note 1, ¶ 22.
27. Id.; INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 16, at 2.
28. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 16, at 2.
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the tribunal, as a matter of contract law, any decision rendered
by the tribunal is binding on the parties.29
The ultimate goal of ISDS is to continue to drive foreign in-
vestment by providing foreign investors with security and confi-
dence that their property and rights will be protected. This is
particularly the case in countries with developing economies and
unsophisticated or unfamiliar legal regimes.30 The countries
most frequently in need of foreign investment are those building
their economy. The lack of sophisticated legal systems in devel-
oping countries creates an inability to protect the investments of
foreign corporations and detracts from interest in investing in
that country.31 Proponents of ISDS argue that the system
achieves this goal by providing neutrality, diplomacy, and pro-
tection to foreign investors.32 ISDS prevents conflict between for-
eign States, provides safeguards to multinational corporations
abroad, and offers potential investors greater confidence that
the law will be enforced in the host countries.33 Additionally,
ISDS is touted for its ability to aid small and medium-sized busi-
nesses that lack the financial resources or legal knowledge nec-
essary to navigate international legal systems.34 Between 1990
and 2015, ISDS panels oversaw 550 disputes involving over 100
different countries.35 Notably, the most common respondents in
these arbitrations were developing countries, such as Argentina
and Venezuela.36 Cases brought under ISDS arbitration most
29. Id.
30. The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TRADEWINDS (Mar.
2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-of-
fice/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguard-
ing-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
31. Hufbauer, supra note 4, at 109.
32. Id.
33. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
34. The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 30.
35. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
36. Id. Between 2003 and 2013, Argentina was the respondent forty-three
times, while Venezuela was the respondent thirty-three times. Id. the Czech
Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, and India, collectively, were the respondents fifty-
eight times. Id. The top five countries with corporate claimants were the
United States, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Id.
Between 2003 and 2013, U.S. corporations filed eighty-four claims, the Neth-
erlands filed fifty-three claims, the United Kingdom filed thirty-six claims,
Germany filed thirty-one claims, and France filed twenty-seven claims. Id.
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QommonHh settHe *'io' to 'eQei%inL tJe a'lit'aH t'il&naH’s Oeci-
sion.37 Therefore, only 356 cases have gone to a final decision.38
Of those 356 awards, a government party has prevailed in 37
percent of the claims brought against them.39 When the govern-
ment wins a case, this does not mean it collects money or dam-
ages from the corporation.40 It simply means it does not have to
pay the corporation for its alleged wrongdoing.41 Foreign inves-
tors have prevailed in 28 percent of their claims in front of an
ISDS tribunal.42 Each year, as foreign investment increases, the
number of cases brought in front of the ISDS tribunals will con-
tinue to increase.43
For an award to be given to the foreign corporation, ISDS ar-
bitrators must find that an action or policy of the government of
the host country harmed the foreign investor.44 The foreign in-
vestor can demonstrate harm in the following ways: (1) by
providing supporting evidence that the State expropriated prop-
erty used for the operation of its business in the State, (2) by
proving that policies or actions of the State were discriminatory,
or (3) by demonstrating that it was treated in amanner that falls
leHoj tJe QommonHh aQQe*teO 7inte'nationaH minim&m stanO`
a'O5 Mo' tJe t'eatment oM Mo'eiLn in%esto's^45 The first type of
claim a foreign corporation can bring is for expropriation.46 Typ-
ically, expropriation claims arise when a government takes the
property of the foreign corporation and develops it for the overall
benefit of the public of that country.47 Second, ISDS arbitrators
may hear discrimination claims alleging that the corporation
was discriminated against by the foreign government because of
37. Don’t Buy the Trade Deal Alarmism, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015).
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-buy-the-trade-deal-alarm-
ism/2015/03/11/41575fee-c1d5-11e4-9271-610273846239_story.html.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Roderick Abbott, Fredrik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, De-
mystifying Investor- State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), European Centre for In-
ternational Political Economy (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.ecipe.org/app/up-
loads/2014/12/OCC52014__1.pdf.
44. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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its nationality.48 Specifically, that the government treated the
foreign investor differently than a domestic investor or treated
two foreign investors from different countries unequally.49 The
third claim a foreign investor may bring against a host country
is for violations of the customary international law when the
country divests from the global standard of treatment for foreign
investors.50 To support this claim, investors must offer evidence
shojinL tJat tJe Lo%e'nment’s *oHiQies o' aQtions je'e a'li`
trary, manifestly arbitrary, or outrageous.51 The applicable
standard is determined by the rules that the governing ISDS tri-
bunal is adhering to, as well as the treaty the State is governed
by.52 If the arbitration panel finds that the host government has
harmed the investor in one of these ways, a determination will
then be made as to how much economic harm the investor has
suffered as a result of the government action.53
This Note will argue that although there is no perfect alterna-
tive to ISDS, the best proposed solution is to simultaneously im-
plement the Investor Court System (ICS) with the improve-
ments originally intended for the ISDS system.54 Part I of this
Note will discuss the background and history of ISDS, covering
early attempts to resolve international trade issues, the evolu-
tion that brought about the current system, and why the need to
address these issues only increases in a more globalized econ-
omy.55 Part II will focus on the United States and their develop-
ing stance on ISDS, as well as the prevalence of ISDS in negoti-
48. Simon Lester, The Rhetoric and Reality of ISDS, CATO INST. (Nov. 10,
2015), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rhetoric-reality-isds.
49. Id.
50. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
51. Lester, supra note 48.
52. Id.
53. Id. Between 2003 and 2013, the most common sector of business to bring
claims was the primary sector, which included oil, mining, and hydrocarbon
corporations. Id. Corporations working in electricity generation accounted for
22 percent of ISDS cases. Id. Manufacturing corporations represented 15 per-
cent of ISDS cases, construction represented 12 percent of ISDS cases, and fi-
nance and insurance represented 18 percent of ISDS cases. Id.
54. Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, Discussion on Investment
in TTIP at the Meeting of the International Trade Committee of the European
Parliament (Mar. 18, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-
4624_en.htm.
55. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 4.
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ations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) and Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).56 Part III will re-
view the criticism ISDS has faced from its opponents and explore
notable cases that ISDS arbitral tribunals have presided over.
Finally, Part IV will discuss solutions, ideas, and improvements
that various parties have made to the ISDS system. These solu-
tions include further defining the types of disputes that can be
heard by international tribunals, preventing conflicts of interest
through further rules for arbitrators, implementing a transpar-
ent decision-making process, publishing and referring to prece-
dent when making a ruling, and creating an appellate system.
I. BACKGROUND ANDHISTORY OF ISDS
ISDS is not a new mechanism.57 In fact, it is decades old.58
Trade disputes arising between host countries and foreign inves-
tors have been present since people were capable of moving
goods across borders.59 One of the earliest forms of investment
into foreign countries began when corporations built factories in
foreign countries and shipped goods overseas.60 During the
twentieth century, international trade grew significantly, as
wealthy countries became capable of trading with other coun-
tries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.61 To address the
growing need for a forum to resolve disputes between foreign in-
vestors and host countries, several different tribunals were es-
tablished, including the London Court of International Arbitra-
tion in 1903, the Arbitration Institute of the StockholmChamber
56. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
57. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 4. In 1903, the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration was established. Id. It was the successor to arbitration tri-
bunals in the city of London in the 1880s. Id. In 1917, the Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce was established as part of the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce. Id. In 1923, the International Court of Arbitra-
tion at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris was established. Id.
The next significant phase in seeking protection for investors occurred after
the end of World War II. Id.
58. Linda Dempsey, ISDS: A Fact- and Experience Based Review, TRANS-
ATLANTIC BUS. COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.transatlanticbusi-
ness.org/news/isds-a-fact-and-experience-based-review/.
59. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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of Commerce in 1917, and the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris, France in 1923.62 There was little progress in
international trade law until the end of World War II.63 Interna-
tional trade issues, such as expropriation, became more common
with the development of newly independent nationalist govern-
ments.64
In 1958, the New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
Mo'Qement oM Zo'eiLn A'lit'aH Aja'Os f7tJe Con%ention5d jas
ratified.65 With 157 signatories, the Convention is now recog-
nized as fundamental in supporting international arbitration.66
The Convention has made arbitral awards enforceable around
the globe by requiring the domestic courts of States that are sig-
natories to recognize private arbitration agreements and
awards.67 Prior to the Convention, if a party received a foreign
award, there was no way for the prevailing party to enforce that
award outside of that jurisdiction, rendering the award nearly
useless.68 For the arbitral award to have utility, the prevailing
party would need to find a court that had jurisdiction over the
losing party and request that the court enforce the arbitral
award against them.69 To address the continued growth of inter-
national trade, the Convention allows the prevailing party to en-
force a foreign award in the court system of any country that is
a signatory to the Convention.70 Even with the Convention as a
safeguard, concerns persisted among investors that this alone
was an insufficient source of protection for their investments in
countries with unfamiliar or unstable legal systems.71
Several countries utilized bilateral trade agreements in an at-
tempt to further ease the concerns of foreign investors and to
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Investment treaties were added to allow companies a mechanism to
settle disputes in a neutral forum. Id. In the 1970s, foreign corporations made
approximately forty expropriation claims against the government per year. Id.
Currently, only three to four expropriation claims are made per year. Id.
65. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. History 192301958, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconven-
tion.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958 (last visited Jan. 28,
2018).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 4N5.
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demonstrate that the government valued and intended to pro-
teQt in%esto's’ *'o*e'th 'iLJts^72 In 1959, the first ISDS clause
emerged in a bilateral trade agreement between Germany and
Pakistan.73 In the 1960s, the ICSID, an institution committed to
resolving disputes between countries and international inves-
tors, was created.74 The ICSID later developed and ratified the
ICSID Convention,75 which became the first multilateral agree-
ment to protect investor rights and resolve investor disputes.76
The ICSID Convention was a major collaborative effort to ad-
dress the concerns of foreign investors about expropriation and
the difficulty navigating unfamiliar domestic court systems.77
Additionally, the United Nations created its own body to address
and develop international trade law—UNCITRAL.78
4RCW69AT’s *&'*ose jas to Q'eate Qonsistent anO &niMo'm
rules for international trade issues through the publication of
conventions, model laws, and model rules.79 These two institu-
tions, the ICSID and UNCITRAL, provided the framework and
forum under which international trade law issues are addressed
today.80 The ISDS language created in 1959 can now be found in
more than 3000 agreements, with 180 different countries as sig-
natories.81
II. THEUNITED STATES AND ISDS
ISDS has appeared in a number of trade agreements that the
United States is signatory to.82 It is a form of dispute resolution
available to U.S. corporations and U.S. citizens investing in for-
eign countries, as well as foreign citizens or corporations invest-
ing in the United States.83 Therefore, with the addition of ISDS
in countries that are joint signatories, the appropriate forum for
disputes between either U.S. corporations operating in a foreign
country or foreign investors operating in the United States, is an
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5; Hufbauer, supra note 4, at 5.
74. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Don’t Buy the Trade Deal Alarmism, supra note 37.
82. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
83. Don’t Buy the Trade Deal Alarmism, supra note 37.
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ISDS arbitration.84 Despite pushback and changing administra-
tions, the United States has historically supported the use of
ISDS. As of December 2016, the United States was a signatory
to fifty trade agreements that included ISDS clauses.85 Using
ISDS, there have been seventeen claims brought against the
United States, with thirteen going to a final decision.86 Of the
cases that have made it to a final decision, the United States has
never had an award against them.87
ISDS has become a divisive discussion topic as free trade
agreements have been in negotiations, including the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the TTP, and
the TTIP.88 In February 2008, negotiations began over the TPP,
and eight years later, in February 2016, the TTP was signed by
the United States and the Pacific Rim countries.89 Proponents of
ISDS in the TTP, including the U.S. government, argued that it
would increase exportation of products manufactured in the
United States, aid economic growth, support and retain Ameri-
can jobs, offer greater protection to the middle class,90 and ad-
%anQe tJe4niteO 8tates’ inte'ests anO %aH&es al'oaO^91Addition-
ally, they argued that ISDS would allow small businesses to de-
velop abroad by avoiding the risks and costs of dealing with the
foreign court system, without being able to afford the proper re-
sources to navigate through it.92 The Obama Administration93
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The signatories to the TTP include Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Peru, the United States, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore, and New
Zealand. TPP: What is it and why does it Matter?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715.
90. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
91. Press Release, OFF. U.S. TRADEREP., Statement by Ambassador Froman
on the Release of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Text (Nov. 2015),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/novem-
ber/statement-ambassador-froman.
92. Id.
93. Here’s the Deal: The Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, MEDIUM (Nov.
5, 2015), https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/here-s-the-deal-
the-text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-103adc324500#.o21sp1e8l.
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stateO tJat tJe 6:: is 7tJe JiLJest stanOa'O t'aOe aL'eement in
Jisto'h^594
The European Union is a signatory to more bilateral invest-
ment treaties than the United States.95 It represents more than
half of the international investment tribunals that have met
over the past decade.96 This makes them the most active users
of ISDS.97 In July 2013, negotiations began between the United
States and the European Union over the TTIP.98 The negotia-
tions lasted for one week each, with the location alternating be-
tween the United States and Brussels.99 The TTIP hopes to fur-
ther opportunities for American businesses in European mar-
kets and create more than thirteen million jobs in the United
States and the European Union.100 The TTIP has many oppo-
nents because of the ISDS provision.101 Major criticisms of the
ISDS provision include the belief that foreign corporations
should not have the opportunity to sue the government in any
forum other than domestic courts,102 as it allows foreign corpo-
rations to challenge State laws and potentially pay large settle-
ments, without using the domestic court system.103
III. CRITICISMS OF ISDS
In the United States, ISDS has received criticism from liberals
and conservatives.104 Conservatives fear that this type of foreign
t'il&naH jiHH tJ'eaten tJe 4niteO 8tates’ so%e'eiLnth lh Li%ing
94. Daniel Marans & Ben Walsh, Historic Trade Deal Confirms Critics’
Worst Fears, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2015, 11:17 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/entry/trade-deal-confirms-advocates-worst-
fears_us_563b9061e4b0411d306ff765.
95. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. EU and US Conclude First Round of TTIP Negotiations in Washington,
EUR. COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941
(last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
101. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pa-
cific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.df3a07e5e896.
102. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 3.
103. Warren, supra note 101.
104. Id.
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international arbitrators a right typically reserved for the do-
mestic courts.105 Unlike American judges, international arbitra-
tors lack the ties and responsibility to uphold the U.S. Constitu-
tion and common law.106 Libertarians, on the other hand, fear
that ISDS will offer subsidies funded by the U.S. taxpayer to
countries that lack sophisticated legal systems to hear these
cases themselves.107 Progressives are concerned that ISDS arbi-
tration will offer multinational corporations greater power than
they already have through potentially large awards to corpora-
tions from the tribunals.108With ISDS, corporations have the op-
portunity to escape the application of strict environmental regu-
lations and labor standards that typically apply to domestic cor-
porations.109 ISDS offers an expansion of the enforceability and
effectiveness of international law in jurisdictions it would not
traditionally reach.110 This tool, however, is only available for a
small niche, specifically corporations who have the financial
ability to invest abroad.111 Domestic investors and individuals
will not reap the benefits of the ISDS system.112
Normally, if a corporation alleged that a grievance was com-
mitted against it, the corporation would have to sue in the do-
mestic court system where it was operating.113 There would be
no distinction in access to the court system for a domestic corpo-
ration or a foreign corporation.114 Under the ISDS system, how-
ever, two corporations operating in the United States, only dis-
tinct from one another in their nationality, do not have access to
the same legal regime.115 For opponents of ISDS, this has become
a significant point of controversy.116 Opponents are concerned
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Adam Hersh, Opinion: The Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship Charade: TPP Isn’t About ‘Free’ Trade At All, MKT. WATCH (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-trans-pacific-partnership-charade-
tpp-isnt-about-free-trade-at-all-2015-10-05.
109. Warren, supra note 101.
110. Lester, supra note 48.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Warren, supra note 101.
114. Lester, supra note 48.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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that corporations, under the ISDS system, will avoid the scru-
tiny given to claims brought in the domestic court system of
highly developed and capable countries, yet will still be able to
move forward with cases against the government.117 Foreign cor-
porations skirt the U.S. domestic court system by bringing their
claims to an arbitration panel.118
If a foreign corporation succeeds in its claims brought to the
inte'nationaH t'il&naHb tJe Jost Qo&nt'h’s tai*ahe's a'e &Hti`
mately paying for the award through taxes.119 Although the
States cannot be forced to alter their laws or change their poli-
cies,120 the potential for such large awards allows foreign corpo-
'ations to QJaHHenLe a *a'tiQi*atinL Qo&nt'h’s Hajs anO Oete' Lo%`
ernments from passing legislation that is similar, as it may cre-
ate a potential claim for a corporation in the future.121 Awards
from ISDS arbitration panels are not nominal. For example, in
2012, a Houston-based oil company was awarded $1.8 billion
USD from Ecuador for terminating an oil-concession contract.122
6Je aja'O jas 'o&LJHh JaHM oM tJe Qo&nt'h’s JeaHtJ l&OLet Mo'
the year.123 These potential price tags, and their ability to impact
legislation, have caused concern with groups promoting climate
change and global health, making them some of the greatest op-
positions of ISDS.124 For example, under ISDS, companies who
make fossil fuels can challenge a legislative ban or limit on en-
ergy extraction, which may aid the fight against climate change,
while also potentially qualifying as expropriation.125 An influen-
tial grassroots environmental organization, the Sierra Club,126
has estimated that as many as 9,000 more U.S. corporations will
117. Stiglitz & Hersh, supra note 108.
118. Warren, supra note 101.
119. Id.
120. DAVID W. RIVKIN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE
IMPORTANCE OF AN INFORMED, FACT-BASED DEBATE, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
TINYURL.COM/L3G5RT9.
121. SeeMarans & Walsh, supra note 94.
122. Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets
Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-
states-ttip-icsid.
123. Id.
124. Hufbauer, supra note 4, at 109.
125. Marans & Walsh, supra note 94.
126. See generally About The Sierra Club, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sier-
raclub.org/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). The Sierra Club is one of the most
influential and largest grassroots environmental organizations. Id.
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le eHiLilHe to QJaHHenLe a Qo&nt'h’s en%i'onmentaH Hajs &sinL tJe
ISDS clause of the TPP.127 ISDS has not only impacted environ-
mental legislation, as the medical community foresees a problem
as well. For example, European States are concerned that they
could see a hike in drug prices with the application of U.S. law
by ISDS arbitrators, as U.S. law traditionally offers drug com-
panies greater protection against competition by preventing the
production of generic drugs.128 Applying U.S. law, the European
government would need to provide patents to drug companies
that, under their own laws, they would not otherwise provide,
preventing the publication of the drugs chemical makeup and
the ability to create competing versions.129
The State signatories have attempted to put safeguards in
place to prevent corporations from taking advantage of ISDS ar-
bitration.130 For example, the TPP has a provision131 allowing a
country to choose not to offer ISDS arbitration to tobacco compa-
nies that bring claims against the government.132 ISDS is still
the default forum for dispute resolution for corporations.133
Therefore, for a country to deny this forum, the government will
need to actively disallow a foreign corporation from using
ISDS.134 Critics argue that by requiring the government to take
this extra step of delineating certain corporations or industries
from using ISDS, the door is opened for corporations, like to-
bacco companies, to intimidate and bribe government officials,
forcing them to use the ISDS system.135 These fears are not un-
substantiated.136 For example, Phillips Morris used ISDS to ar-
127. TPP TEXT ANALYSIS: THE TPP WOULD INCREASE RISKS TO OUR AIR,
WATER, AND CLIMATE, SIERRA CLUB 1, https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.si-
erraclub.org/files/uploads-wysiwig/INITIAL%20ANALYSIS%20-
%20ENVIRO%20IMPLICATIONS%20TPP.pdf.
128. Marans & Walsh, supra note 94.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally Philip Morris Sues Australia Over Cigarette Packaging,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15815311
(Philip Morris brings suit against Australia); Matthew C. Porterfield & Chris-
topher R. Byrnes, Phillips Morris v. Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration
Send Restrictions on Tobacco Market Up in Smoke?, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE
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gue a regulation that was implemented as a public health meas-
ure on the sale of cigarettes harmed their profits and was expro-
priation.137
Adversaries of ISDS disagree with proponents who claim that
arbitrators appointed to the ISDS panel will be independent and
unbiased.138 Unlike U.S. judges, who have either lifelong or set
terms, ISDS arbitrators are private lawyers who are paid to pre-
side over a certain arbitration proceeding, while also maintain-
ing their private businesses.139 These arbitrators, on average,
are paid $600N$700 USD per hour.140 This level of compensation
and hourly rate system gives them little incentive to dismiss a
case or resolve it expediently.141 Arbitrators used in ISDS are
selected from a pool of potential arbitrators coming from unin-
terested countries that are signatories to trade agreements that
contain ISDS.142 Unlike judges, these lawyers are not bound by
the same conflict of interest rules.143 Frequently, the lawyers
hired to hear these cases are the same lawyers recruiting them
as clients in the future.144 Not only are they not bound by the
same conflict of interest rules, but due to the private nature of
arbitration, they are not accountable to the public the way
judges are.145 ISDS arbitrators, unlike judges in domestic courts,
are not obligated to make decisions based on U.S. law. Instead,
their decisions are based off of the trade agreement and custom-
ary international law.146 Unique to ISDS, arbitrators are not
bound by case precedent, giving them the opportunity to make
unpredictable decisions.147 Additionally, they do not face the
DEV. (July 12, 2011) http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uru-
guay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-
up-in-smoke/.
137. Marans & Walsh, supra note 94; Stiglitz & Hersh, supra note 108.
138. Warren, supra note 101.
139. Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-econom-
ics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-ar-
bitration [hereinafter ECONOMIST].
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same review as judges go through under the appeals process, as
arbitration decisions are final and binding against the parties.148
The purpose of ISDS was to drive foreign investment during
World War II and address concerns that countries lacking devel-
oped legal systems would not be able to protect foreign inves-
tors.149 The environment for foreign investment that existed
then is not the same facing foreign corporations today.150 Signa-
tories to the TTP have flourishing economies and sophisticated
legal systems that can fairly deal with a case brought by a for-
eign investor.151 For countries that do not have legal systems
that can appropriately handle these cases, the market will ap-
propriately adjust for these risks.152 Corporations can choose not
to invest in those companies if the risk is too great. They can also
find a way to invest in the country politically to help them fur-
ther develop and safeguard their property rights.153 As a result
of this system, greater value will be placed on investing in coun-
tries with a stable legal system, which will incentivize countries
to develop legal regimes capable of providing confidence to in-
vestors.154
IV. NOTEWORTHY CASES UNDER ISDS
The number of cases brought for arbitration between countries
and private investors under ISDS has increased over the past
two decades.155 Prior to 2003, there were fewer than one hundred
cases filed with ISDS.156 At the beginning of the 2000s, when
compared to the 1990s, there was a decrease in the number of
ISDS cases.157 Between 2003 and 2013, there were 461 cases
filed for ISDS arbitration.158 That growth has only increased in
recent years.159 Since 2014, there have been more than sixty
cases filed for ISDS arbitration.160 The most active users of ISDS
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 8.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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are investors in the European Union.161 The European Union is
the respondent in more than half of the complaints filed with
international investment tribunals, making them the most prev-
alent respondent.162 Investors from the United States, however,
more frequently use ISDS arbitration.163 Corporations using the
ISDS system frequently work in areas with a high level of gov-
ernment involvement and political patronage.164 Frequently,
these cases are settled before the tribunal has made its ruling.165
The tobacco industry is infamous for taking advantage of in-
ternational investment rules to alter government restrictions on
the tobacco market.166 Wn tJe G==\sb CanaOa *asseO a 7*Hain
*aQkinL5manOate as a Mo'm oM tolaQQo Qont'oH 'eL&lation, requir-
ing the removal of attractive packaging on cigarette cartons.167
All packages would need to have standardized colors, brand
name depictions, size, materials, and opening methods.168 The
goal of the policy was to decrease tobacco purchases.169 In re-
sponse, a tobacco company contacted the Canadian Committee
on Health, stating it would sue the government for expropriation
if the legislation passed, costing taxpayers millions of dollars.170
The Canadian government moved forward with the legislation
but it was ultimately struck down by the Canadian Supreme
Court.171 There is speculation, however, that the tobacco com-
*anh’s tJ'eat sto**eO tJe Lo%e'nment M'om a**eaHinL tJe OeQi`
sion.172
Similarly, Uruguay passed legislation regulating tobacco use
in their country.173 The tobacco products were required to have
a 7sinLHe *'esentation5 anO Qom*anies je'e *'oJiliteO M'om
161. Id.
162. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 8.
163. Porterfield & Brynes, supra note 136.
164. Abbott et al., supra note 43, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Rob Cunningham&Ken Kyle, The Case for Plain Packaging, 4 TOBACCO
CONTROL 80, 1 (1995), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti-
cles/PMC1759383/pdf/v004p00080.pdf.
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marketing more than one tobacco product for each brand.174 The
tolaQQo *aQkaLes aHso JaO to inQH&Oe 7*iQtoL'ams5 jitJ L'a*JiQ
images of the health consequences of smoking.175 Finally, there
was a mandate that health warnings must cover 80 percent of
the front of a cigarette package.176 As a result, Phillips Morris
moved for ISDS arbitration.177 Phillips Morris argued that regu-
lations violated the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment
Treaty.178 The corporation sought damages totaling $25 million
USD, while also demanding that the application of the regula-
tion be suspended.179 Phillip Morris claimed the regulations de-
valued its investment and right to a cigarette trademark.180 The
corporation argued that legislation frustrated its legitimate ex-
pectation of a stable and predictable regulatory framework.181
Phillip Morris also claimed it was denied fair and equitable
t'eatmentb as 'e(&i'eO lh tJe Wo'HO 6'aOe ;'Lanigation’s
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.182 In July 2016, ICSID found in favor of Uruguay.183 Phil-
lips Morris was required to pay Uruguay $7million USD in dam-
ages, as well as cover all fees and expenses owed to the Tribu-
nal.184 This decision dealt a significant blow to the tobacco indus-
try.185 The award will hopefully deter the tobacco industry from
174. FTR Holdings S.A. (Switzerland) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Part II—Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope, and Use of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 3, 2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm. The World
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights sets minimum standards for intellectual property regulations
for nations that are World Trade Organization members. Id.
183. Phillips Morris v. Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration Send Re-
strictions on Tobacco Marketing Up in Smoke?, INV. TREATY NEWS (July 12,
2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-will-inves-
tor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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using ISDS to challenge tobacco control legislation in the fu-
ture.186
In 2008, in response to the financial crisis, the Spanish gov-
ernment began to revoke subsidies that it had previously offered
to solar companies.187 The government did so in an attempt to
decrease its expenditures and balance the budget.188 The revoca-
tion of subsidies occurred over five years.189 Between 2011 and
2013, twenty-two different companies sued Spain in response to
the revocation of their subsidies.190 Despite Spain announcing
the reversal of subsidies three years prior, a private equity firm
and investment fund purchased Spanish solar power plants.
They also bought claims against the government for the denial
of the subsidies.191 Unlike domestic investors, the foreign inves-
tors were able to bring suit in front of an ISDS Tribunal.192 The
foreign investors claimed that despite the announcement indi-
cating subsidies would be reversed, the investors believed that
Spain would continue to offer them.193 After the financial crisis,
Spain halted their distribution of renewable energy subsidies.194
The government had to expend money and resources to defend
its position to the ISDS panel.195 Previous arbitration decisions
favored Spain, but in May 2017, Spain lost its first international
arbitration decision over the subsidy cuts.196 The ICSID tribunal
found that Spain had denied the foreign corporation fair and eq-
uitable treatment.197 This is an unfortunate outcome for Spain,
186. Alexandria Nightingale, The Significance of Uruguay’s Win Over Phil-
lips Morris International, INT’L PROP. WATCH (July 21, 2016), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2016/07/21/the-significance-of-uruguays-win-over-philip-morris-in-
ternational/.
187. David Dayen, The Big Problem with the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isds-
lawsuit-financing-tpp_us_57c48e40e4b09cd22d91f660.
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192. Id.
193. Id.
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196. Miguel Ángel Noceda, Spain Loses First Arbitration Claim Over Cuts to
Renewable Energy Subsidies, EL PAÍS (May 5, 2017),
https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/05/05/inenglish/1493988308_857826.html.
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as it still faces dozens of other arbitrations over the subsidy rev-
ocation.198 In the first case, the Tribunal dismissed the first of
twenty investment complaints.199 The Tribunal argued that the
investors could have easily predicted the change in subsidies dis-
tribution.200
V. THE SOLUTION
ISDS was developed to address the risks inherent in increased
investment abroad and to show a commitment by host countries
to enforcing their investment treaties.201 Trade agreements,
such as the TTP and the TTIP, have faced resistance because of
tJe M&nOamentaH Oist'&st in W8r8’s aliHith to a**'o*'iateHy re-
solve investment disputes.202 Ideas for how to improve dispute
resolution between investors and foreign States have ranged
from refining ISDS to proposing a completely new forum.203 Op-
ponents are concerned with the lack of transparency in the arbi-
tral trib&naH’s OeQision-making, the inequitable treatment of do-
mestic and foreign investors, the ability of large arbitral awards
to influence a State’s Q&''ent anO M&t&'e *oHiQiesb anO tJe *oten`
tial disruption of a State’s aliHith to 'eL&Hate l&siness jitJin its
borders.204 The TTP has attempted to maintain the ISDS frame-
work, while simultaneously implementing some improvements.
The proposed improvements hope to achieve respect for environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations, while also offering
greater transparency through open proceedings and participa-
tion by constituents interested in the dispute who are not neces-
sarily parties to the dispute. 205 Some countries have taken a dif-
ferent tactic, outright rejecting the use of ISDS in their invest-
ment treaties.206 Australia has stated it will no longer support
198. Id.
199. Dayen, supra note 187.
200. Id.
201. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) STATE OF PLAY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 16, at 1.
202. Warren, supra note 101.
203. ECONOMIST, supra note 139.
204. Id.
205. Hufbauer, supra note 4, at 110.
206. ECONOMIST, supra note 139.
2018] ISDS Alternative 659
ISDS in future trade agreements.207 Brazil has continuously re-
fused to sign trade agreements that contain ISDS.208 South Af-
rica and India have stated that they will withdraw from treaties
with ISDS clauses.209 As more countries refuse to sign treaties
with ISDS included, making improvements to the current sys-
temmay no longer be sufficient. Recognizing the growing discon-
tent with the ISDS system during negotiations for the TTIP, the
European Union introduced a new proposed solution, the ICS.210
Much like ISDS, however, the ICS has faced similar criti-
cisms.211
There is no perfect solution to the criticisms of ISDS. Many
countries have attempted to offer suggestions for how to address
the criticisms it has faced. For example, to resolve concerns of
conflicts of interest for arbitrators, the South African Develop-
ment Comm&nith f78AC SoOeH5d s&LLesteO OisaHHojinL a'lit'a`
tors from acting as counsel in any other arbitration that involves
treaty-based investor-state arbitration.212 Additionally, to end
concerns of impeding state sovereignty, suggestions have been
made to limit the scope of claims by adding specificity to treaty
language.213 For example, treaties frequently use language such
as Mo'eiLn in%esto's m&st 'eQei%e 7Mai' anO e(&italHe t'eatment^5
214 This phrase is too broad and lacks predictability.215 This issue
could be addressed by removing the generality and further de-
fining the meaning of these terms.216 Another suggested im-
provement is to delineate specific types of claims to be brought
under ISDS, such as nationality based discrimination and expro-
priation and clarify that all other disputes are to be brought to
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Nikolaj Nielsen, TTIP Investor Court Illegal, Say German Judges, EU
OBSERVER (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:17 PM), https://euobserver.com/economic/132142.
211. FROM ISDS TO ICS: A LEOPARD CAN’T CHANGE ITS SPOTS, GREENPEACE 7
(Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-
briefings/2016/2016_02_11_Greenpeace%20Position%20Pa-
per%20ICS_Final.pdf [hereinafter GREENPEACE].
212. SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE WITH
COMMENTARY, SOUTH AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY 62 (July 2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-
Template-Final.pdf [hereinafter SOUTH AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY].
213. Lester, supra note 48.
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the domestic court system of the State.217 To keep as many cases
in domestic courts as possible and maintain state sovereignty, a
requirement that foreign investors exhaust all local remedies be-
fore bringing a claim to an ISDS tribunal has been suggested.218
To address inconsistencies in decisions and the lack of predicta-
bility, an appeal mechanism has been suggested.219Each of these
improvements would help address the criticisms against ISDS.
Their success, however, may be limited within the ISDS model.
The European Union has found that these refinements alone
are not enough to resolve all of the concerns with ISDS, instead
proposing the ICS as a better solution.220 In 2015, after extensive
discussions with the European Council and the European Par-
liament, the European Commission suggested a replacement to
ISDS.221 The European Parliament voted in favor of the TTIP,
but only if ISDS was replaced with a new system to resolve in-
ternational investment disputes.222 The European Parliament
was concerned ISDS was not public and transparent, corpora-
tions were not subject to public law, and that the interests of
foreign investors were taking precedent over the public inter-
est.223 The number of judges sitting on the ICS will depend on
the number of cases heard by the Court and the number of coun-
tries that agree to participate in the ICS.224 The EU states that
the selection of permanent and full-time judges will be independ-
ent and objective.225 To achieve transparency, all documents and
hearings would be public and published online.226 The ICS would
217. Id.
218. MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, MY GOV.
15N16 https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_im-
age/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Invest-
ment%20Treaty.pdf.
219. Malmström, supra note 54.
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EURACTIV (July 9, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-eu-
rope/news/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejects-isds/.
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EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm.
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222. Roberts, supra note 220.
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have an appeals mechanism to address potential errors in prior
judgments and ensure consistency in rulings.227 The European
Union hopes that after implementing the ICS within the United
States and the European Union, the ICS will eventually expand
into a universal multilateral court for all investment disputes.228
When introducing the proposed ICS, EU Trade Commissioner,
Cecilia Malmströmb stateO 7ojne jant to estalHisJ a nej shstem
built around the elements that make citizens trust domestic or
inte'nationaH Qo&'ts^5229
Critics of this solution fear that the ICS has many of the same
problems as ISDS.230 For example, the German Association of
Magistrate, a Berlin judicial organization, has stated that it
7sees neitJe' a HeLaH lasis no' a neeO Mo' s&QJ a Qo&'tb5 anO tJat
the ICS would undermine domestic courts, depriving govern-
ments of their power.231 There is no restriction in place to stop a
judge from acting as counsel for a foreign investor and judge in
cases brought by investors.232 Critics claim the ICS judges will
not have the same conflict of interest rules and scrutiny as do-
mestic judges.233 ICS courts will still only be available for foreign
investors.234 This divided system will create separate levels of
scrutiny for domestic and foreign investors.235 Since judges will
be selected from each perspective government, however, this will
at least offer domestic judges an opportunity to apply domestic
laws.236 Domestic case precedent from the European Union and
the United States does not bind the ICS.237 In the alternative,
neither European Union domestic courts nor United States do-
mestic courts will need to make consistent rulings with the ICS
case precedent.238 The ICS model, through its proposed appeals
227. Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other
EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, supra note 221.
228. Malmström, supra note 54.
229. Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other
EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, supra note 221.
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process, addresses some concerns regarding ISDS, specifically
its inconsistency and lack of case precedent.239
Although the ICS has faced criticism, it could be a solution to
many of the concerns raised by critics of ISDS by implementing
the safeguards and solutions countries have put forth.240 Since
the ICS was proposed during the negotiations for the TTIP, it
would only apply to the countries that are signatories to that
agreement. If the ICS is successful, however, it has the ability to
expand into a multilateral system, available to all countries, and
create a comprehensive, universal system that provides con-
sistent treatment and a forum for all foreign corporations.241Un-
like ISDS, the ICS offers an appellate review board that allows
either party to appeal a decision, ensuring that each country and
foreign investor is reviewed using the same standards.242 Addi-
tionally, the ICS hopes to increase the number of reviewers on a
case anO as a 'es&Htb M&'tJe' 'e*'esent eaQJ Qo&nt'h’s HeLaH shs`
tem and values.243Much like the suggestion proposed in the SAC
Model, instead of arbitrators being appointed to hear a specific
case, the ICS judges would be permanent appointees.244 There-
fore, in hopes of easing concerns of impartiality, the ICS judges
would never need to recruit international corporations as their
future clients.245 To prevent a flooding of the ICS, as previously
suggested, the ICS could require that foreign investors exhaust
all legal remedies available to them in their host country prior
to bringing a case to the ICS.246 This would address the fear that
foreign investors are escaping harsh review by domestic courts
and attempting to alter public policy by bringing their case to a
foreign court.247 Finally, if the ICS is able to hear only an ex-
tremely limited number of cases, this could prevent the concerns
that a countries sovereignty is being harmed.248 Although there
is no forum that will relieve all parties of their concerns, the ICS
239. Id. at 7.
240. SOUTH AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY, supra note 212, at 62; Malmström, supra
note 54.
241. Malmström, supra note 54.
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243. GREENPEACE, supra note 211, at 2.
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answers many of the issues raised by critics regarding ISDS.249
Many countries have already implemented improvements that
could help the ICS, making it the best solution thus far to protect
investors abroad.250
CONCLUSION
Despite a rapidly evolving global economy and with it, further
international trade disputes, ISDS has evolved little since its in-
ception, more than sixty years ago. Recent trade negotiations
over agreements containing ISDS as the selected forum of dis-
pute resolution, such as the TTP, the TTIP, and CETA, have
generated new attention, criticism, and evaluation of ISDS.
These discussions have fostered ideas for alterations and im-
provements to the current system, as well as suggestions of com-
pletely new forums for addressing these international trade is-
sues, such as the ICS. Opponents continue to argue that the ben-
efits offered by ISDS are not outweighed by the impact the sys-
tem has on state sovereignty and the ability for States to pass
progressive environmental and public health legislation. The
concerns do not end there. Dissenters argue that ISDS does not
sufficiently prevent conflicts of interest between arbitrators and
the parties bringing disputes, lacks a transparent decision-mak-
ing process, and creates inconsistent and unpredictable rulings.
Different constituencies have suggested improvements to ad-
dress these concerns but even with these suggestions, many con-
tinue to argue that ISDS is inherently flawed and a new solution
must be found. Responses have ranged from abandoning ISDS
all together and leaving these disputes to the States to creating
a new, broader multilateral decision-making body. The Euro-
pean Union proposed the ICS as the alternative to oversee the
complaints made by international investors against the Euro-
pean Union, with the hope that if the ICS is successful, it would
eventually expand into a multilateral and universal court sys-
tem available to all.251 The ICS is intended to create greater
transparency, coherency, and fairness through improvements
such as, the implementation of an appeals process, further reli-
ance on precedent to create predictability, and further defining
249. Warren, supra note 101.
250. Hufbauer, supra note 4, at 118N19.
251. Roberts, supra note 220.
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tJe WC8’s I&'isOiQtion anO sQo*e oM Qases Jea'O^252 The ICS, how-
ever, faces many of the same criticisms that were argued against
ISDS. With no perfect solution available, the current viable op-
tions are to universally adopt the ICS and implement the im-
provements intended for ISDS to the ICS, creating a piecemeal
version of the two or leave foreign investors to fend for them-
selves in foreign domestic courts, as they did up until the twen-
tieth century.253 With foreign investment growing each day, de-
spite their flaws, it is necessary to find a compromise between
ISDS and the ICS, as they are currently the best alternatives
available.
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